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PROTECTING WETLANDS

OVERVIEW: LUCAS IS A LIMITED, YET SIGNIFICANT SWIPE
AT WETLANDS PROTECTION

When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened its Scientific Advisory Board to prioritize the environmental
risks facing our society, its members concluded that among the highest risks we face as a society is the rapid loss of our natural ecosystems, particularly wetlands, and the biological diversity they
support.I Unfortunately, the Supreme Court majority deciding Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council' on the last day of the 1991-1992
term did not seem to recognize these societal risks.
The Lucas Majority [hereinafter Majority] opinion ignores the
social harm in destroying wetlands and other natural ecosystems, while
favoring stringent protection of private property rights. Justice Scalia,
joined by Justices O'Connor, White, Rehnquist, and Thomas, clearly
stretching to reach the merits of this case, abandon their usual insistence on judicial restraint.3 The primary motivation for this newfound judicial activism seems to be the Majority's distaste for the
South Carolina Supreme Court's "categorical disposition" of Mr.
regulatory scheme for protecting
Lucas' claim, in favor of the State's
4
coastal beach-dune ecosystems .
The Majority specifically targets ecosystem protection regulations. The Majority observes that regulations which deprive landowners of all economically beneficial use of land are "typically" those
that require land "to be left substantially in its natural state," 5 and
that such regulations are more likely than others to involve private
property being "pressed into some form of public service under the
guise of mitigating serious public harm. ' 6 Equating government efforts to protect wetlands and coastal areas with aesthetic open space
and scenic easement efforts, the Majority refuses to acknowledge that

1. Relative Risk Reduction Strategies Committee, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection. Science Advisory
Board, AI01, SAB-EC 90-021 (September 1990).
2. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
3. Id. at 2907-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 2919-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 2925-26
(Souter, J., statement).
4. Id. at 2890-92, 2898-99, 2901-02. A second motivation appears to have been a desire
to establish clear-cut, categorical takings rules to clean up the "messy" takings case law that
comes from case-specific inquiry targeted at achieving fairness. Id. at 2892-93 referencing Professor Epstein's commentary on the "incomprehensible" "array of ad hoc [takings] decisions."
See also id. at 2925 (Souter, J., statement)(suggesting that the purpose of taking the Lucas
case was to "clarify the concept of total (and, in the Court's view, categorically compensable)
taking...").
5. Id. at 2894-95.
6. Id. at 2895.
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the protection of wetland and coastal ecosystems can be crucial to
public safety and welfare.7
The Majority's ecological blind spot is confirmed at the close of
the opinion. Despite well-documented and uncontested legislative
findings that clearly demonstrate the public and private harm attributable to beachfront development, 8 the Court observes, in dicta, that
it is unlikely that South Carolina common law principles would have
prevented the development of Lucas' land. 9
By the Court's own admission, the Lucas case is of very limited
application. 0 The decision is based upon the factual finding by the
South Carolina trial court that the application of the South Carolina
Beachfront Management Act" to Lucas' two beachfront lots deprived
him of all economically viable use of his two lots, rendering them,
in the words of the trial court - "valueless."'" Consequently, the
Court's decision only addresses those "relatively rare," indeed, "extraordinary" circumstances "when no productive or economically
beneficial use of land is permitted .... ."I' Even this
fundamental
4
factual premise is highly suspect in the Lucas case.'
In addition, the Majority's sweeping compensation requirements
for "total takings" are made strictly on the basis of a temporary
taking - and a questionable one at that. In 1990, two years after
the challenged restriction became effective, the South Carolina Legislature amended the Beachfront Management Act, authorizing the
Coastal Council to issue special permits in certain circumstances for
construction of habitable structures within the restricted area.0' This
special permit authority offers Lucas an as-yet-untapped administrative remedy which may indeed allow him to build on his lots. Consequently, the only cognizable deprivation suffered by Lucas at the
stage of this Supreme Court review was the possible taking of his
right to build on or sell his two lots during the period between 1988

7. Id. See also, Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's
Changing Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REV. 205

(1991).
8. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896; 2904-07. See also n.l.
9. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. "It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioners' land; they
rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land." Id. (citing Curtis v. Benson, 222
U.S. 778, 86 (1911)).
10. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to -360 (Supp. 1992).

12. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890, 2895, 2896 n.9.
13. Id. at 2894 (emphasis in original).
14. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); 2910, 2908 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 291920 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 2925 (Souter, J., statement).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Supp. 1992).
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was not demonstrated in the record
and 1990. This temporary taking
6
before the Supreme Court.
In light of these factual limitations, the practical effect of this
decision with respect to Mr. Lucas' property may be minimal. When
the South Carolina Supreme Court revisited the Lucas case on remand,1 7 it found no state common law principles to support a "total
taking" without compensation, and determined that Lucas did in fact
have a temporary taking claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court
seemed to rely heavily on its conclusion that its earlier "categorical
disposition" of the case on nuisance grounds had precluded Lucas
from asserting his temporary takings claim after the law changed in
1990. The South Carolina Supreme Court did not address the underlying factual issue of whether Lucas was actually deprived of all
economic use of his land.'
Having determined that Lucas was entitled to pursue his temporary takings claim in the lower court, however, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that Lucas must establish actual damages resulting from the restrictions on his lots between 1988 and the Court's
November 1992 order. While the parties are being permitted to supplement the record for this purpose, the record before the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that a large award is not likely to be
forthcoming. 9
The importance, and in this author's view, the tragedy of the
Lucas decision lies more in the signals it sends private investors than
in the new takings law it creates. The Majority demonstrates its own
subjective preferences for sacrosanct private property rights over serious public health and welfare concerns. As Justice Stevens notes,
the Court's ruling is, in effect, a form of insurance against certain
changes in land-use regulations, encouraging developers to over-invest
"safe in the knowledge that if the law changes adversely, they will
be entitled to compensation. ' 20 Insulating developers against risks associated with ecologically-harmful development will surely accelerate
the decline of this country's functioning natural ecosystems.

16. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919, 2917 n.1 (Stevens, J.,dissenting); 2909, 2908, n.5 (Black-

mun, J., dissenting) Mr. Lucas testified at trial that he was "in no hurry" to build "because
the lot was appreciating in value."). Id.
17. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992).
18. Id. at 486.
19. Had it not been for the South Carolina Supreme Court's earlier "categorical disposition" of the Lucas claim, the Court, on remand, possibly could have rejected the takings
claim on standing or ripeness grounds, absent a showing that he had exhausted all administrative
remedies and demonstrated a concrete injury. The court also might have concluded that substantial economically viable use of the land remains. See dissenting opinions cited supra note

14 and infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
Farber, Economic
20. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921-22, n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN.. 125 (1992)).
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Despite the limited immediate application of the Lucas opinion,
the decision surely will influence future governmental efforts to maintain and restore wetlands. 21 This article first analyzes the Lucas opinion with a particular focus on its implications for federal wetlands
regulation, 22 and its relationship to the basic purposes of the Fifth
Amendment Just Compensation Clause. The article then explores
common law bases for wetlands regulation and potential measures
which may be help to protect wetlands, as well as reasonable investment-backed expectations, in the wake of the Lucas decision.
I.

THE

Lucas Decision and Wetlands Protection

In 1977, the South Carolina Legislature passed the Coastal Zone
Management Act 23 in response to passage of the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972.24 Originally, the South Carolina law required owners of coastal zone land within defined "critical areas"
(beaches and adjacent sand dunes) to obtain a permit from the South
25
Carolina Coastal Council prior to converting such land to a new use.
In the late 1970's, Lucas became a resident, as well as a developer,
of the "Wild Dune" development on the Isle of Palms, a barrier
island east of Charleston, South Carolina. Lucas was, and is a contractor, manager, and part owner of the development.2 6
In 1986, Lucas purchased, for $975,000, two of the four remaining vacant lots in one of the "Wild Dune" residential subdivisions. At the time of Lucas' purchase, these two lots were zoned
for single family residences, and they were not within a "critical area"
under the 1977 state coastal management law. However, the two lots
and the immediately surrounding shorefront were "notoriously unstable." ' 27 It is these two lots that are the subject of the Supreme
Court's decision.
Lucas' two lots changed hands numerous times between 1979 and
the time he purchased them in 1986. Each transaction reflected rapidly
escalating prices for the lots. The appreciation continued even after
the 1988 land use restrictions were imposed. The record provides no
explanation as to why none of these purchasers chose to build on

21. See infra notes 51-103 and 144-193 and accompanying text.
22. Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) authorizes the
only purely regulatory federal wetlands protection program. 33 U.S.C. 1344 (1988). Most state

regulatory programs are similar, sometimes identical, in their general approach to regulation.
Consequently, this article focuses on the FWPCA § 404 permit program for its analysis.
23. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -220 (1987).
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988).
25. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
26. Id. at 2889, 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27. "In roughly half of the last 40 years, all or part of petitioner's property was part
of the beach or flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow of the tide." [d.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss2/1
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the lots, other than the evidence of the lots' instability and Lucas'
own testimony that he was "in no hurry" to build on the sites in
light of their appreciating value. 28 The record does not reflect any
immediate plans by Lucas to build on or sell the property. 29
In 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront
Management Act.30 The Act was passed in response to a Blue Ribbon
Panel Report finding critical coastal erosion and proposing additional
developmental restrictions to control it. The Act amended the original
state coastal management law, expanding development restrictions to
broader critical areas. These critical areas, based on the "best scientific and historical data available," were defined as the areas seaward of a baseline connecting points of beach erosion. Lucas' lots
came within the erosion baseline, primarily because they were located
adjacent to tidal inlets which had not been secured with groins, riprap, or other structural erosion control measures.3"
Mr. Lucas immediately filed a takings claim in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas. The trial court found that the prohibition on permanent, habitable structures rendered Lucas' lots
"valueless." The court ordered the Council to pay $1.23 million in
compensation.32 In 1990, after the case was briefed and argued before
the South Carolina Supreme Court, but before the Court reached a
decision, the South Carolina Legislature amended the Beachfront
Management Act to authorize issuance of special permits. These permits allow for development in the critical areas under certain cirLucas
cumstances. While potentially eligible for such a special permit,
33
has not yet availed himself of this administrative remedy.
When the South Carolina Supreme Court decided the appeal in
1991, it did not require pursuit of the special permit remedy. Nor
did the Court require the trial court to develop a fuller record on
the diminution in value attributable to the 1988 restriction. Instead,
it concluded that the Beachfront Management Act restrictions were
clearly intended to prevent serious public harm and that, as a result,
no compensation was required regardless of the restrictions' impact
on Lucas' property value. 34 It was this conclusion of the South Carolina Supreme Court that was taken on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.
28.
29.
30.
31.
280(A)(2)

Id. at 2905 n.3, 2908-09, n.5.
Id. at 2919, 2917 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 2908-09, n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to -360 (Supp. 1992).
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889 n.1 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-270(7) and 48-39(Supp. 1988)).

32. Id. at 2890-91.
33. Id. (citing S.C. CODE § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Supp. 1991)). The Coastal Council raised
the issue of ripeness before the South Carolina Supreme Court, but the Court chose to dispose
of the case on the merits. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2890-91.
34. Id. at 2890-92.
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THE MAJORITY'S CATEGORICAL RULE REQUIRING COMPENSATION
FOR A "TOTAL TAKING"

The CategoricalRule
The first prong of the Lucas holding is the pronouncement of

a categorical rule that "regulatory action is compensable without casespecific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the
restraint ... where regulation denies all economically beneficial or

productive use of the land." '3 5 The Majority justifies its categorical
rule first by equating the regulatory "total taking" with a physical
appropriation of property, which almost always requires compensation.16 The Majority further reasons that in the "extraordinary circumstance" of a total taking, it is both difficult to assume that
regulation secures an "average reciprocity of advantage" to everyone
concerned, and difficult to argue that compensation requirements will
seriously hamstring important government operations. 7 Finally, the
Majority observes that regulations which result in a "total takings"
carry "a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm." 3
While the Majority's rationale certainly explains why the total
deprivation of economically viable use of one's land is an important
factor in determining whether the Fifth Amendment requires compensation, it does not provide a convincing rationale for a categorical
rule requiring compensation. Jurists and commentators have identified two primary and related purposes for the Just Compensation
Clause: allowing for governmental action while (1)ensuring fairness
and justice in the government's treatment of private property, and

(2) protecting reasonable investment-backed expectations in the face
of governmental action.3 9
The Just Compensation Clause "was designed to bar [g]overnment
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
'4
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."

35. Id. at 2892-93 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 2894-95.
37. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-415 (1922)).
38. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
39. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness,Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192-1193 (1967) [hereinafter
Michelman]; Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 60 (1964) [hereinafter

Sax]; Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. I [hereinafter
Epstein]; Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2923 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Monongahela Navigation Co.
v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). The Framers of the Constitution were clearly
concerned with the potential of the government-or factions thereof-to single out certain
individuals arbitrarily to bear the load of the public enterprise through property confiscation.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss2/1
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The Takings Clause was written to protect against the unfair confiscation of property by the government. Clearly, governmental fairness in the treatment of private property is an important component
of individual liberty.
From a utilitarian standpoint, the Just Compensation Clause protects private property in order to foster private investment and labor
for a productive society. 4'An individual's secure expectations that rules
governing the use and enjoyment of property will be followed motivate the individual labor and investment required for the production
of goods and services that benefit society as a whole. From this utilitarian theory comes the Supreme Court's emphasis on "reasonable
investment-backed expectations. "42
Clearly, respect for private property is essential to individual liberty and productivity. Yet, these private property interests must also
be balanced against concerns for the public health, safety, and welfare
that prompt government regulation. United States Supreme Court just
compensation decisions have consistently turned on "the particular
circumstances of each case," with "the ultimate conclusion necessarily requir[ing] a weighing of private and public interests." 43 A categorical rule requiring compensation for "total takings" is inconsistent
with the underlying purposes of the Just Compensation Clause and
a clear departure from Supreme Court precedent.
Segmentation of Property Interests-Footnote 7
The Lucas Majority assures us that total takings are an "extraordinary circumstance." Yet, this may not be so in the future if
property owners are permitted to isolate the specific property interests
burdened by regulation from their total real estate investments, and
to successfully claim a "total taking" of that particular interest. The
Lucas Majority has surely invited a new round of litigation to exploit
this issue by unnecessarily raising it in Footnote 7 of the opinion."
B.

41. Michelman, supra note 39, at 1210-11.
42. Id. at 1213. "The Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property
law; it protects private expectations to ensure private investment." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2911
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2919-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. 112 S. Ct. at 2894. Footnote 7 adds nothing to the holding in the Lucas case since
the Majority accepts at face value the state court's determination that the coastal land use
restriction rendered Lucas' two beachfront lots without economic value. Flyers advertising a
recent legal seminar on the Lucas decision illustrate the potential for upcoming litigation on
this issue. A key agenda item reads: "How to use Justice Scalia's 'Footnote 7' to your advantage. How to define 'the parcel' or property unit to demonstrate 'deprivation of all economically-feasible use,' thereby enhancing your ability to prove a regulatory taking requiring
compensation. How to fractionalize current property holdings to discourage regulation?" National Real Estate Development Center, How to Successfully Resolve Land Use and Real Estate
Regulation Issues in the Wake of Lucas (1992).
One might ask whether such manipulation of property interests can ever allow for a realistic
assessment of a landowner's "investment-backed expectations". . . never mind a realistic assessment of "fairness and justice." See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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In Footnote 7, the Majority states that its categorical rule for "total
takings" does not clearly delineate the "property interest" against
which the loss of value is to be measured. The Court either ignores
or explicitly rejects existing Supreme4 Court precedent requiring consideration of the parcel as a whole. 1
The Majority also suggests that the "interest in land" at issue
in this case is Mr. Lucas' fee simple interest in his two beachfront
lots, and that each of these two lots is clearly distinct property interests which form the denominator of two separate takings fractions. 46 As Justice Stevens notes, past Supreme Court takings cases
spoke of a taking where a regulation "denies an owner economically
viable use of his land," not the use of an "interest in land." Justice
Stevens concludes that Footnote 7 suggests landowners may be entitled to compensation for a total taking of any real property interest. 47

Numerous legal commentators have noted the great potential for
abusing a categorical "total takings" rule, particularly because of the
potential for artificially segmenting property interests. 41 Clearly, allowing property owners to artificially segment their property holdings
in order to ensure compensation for governmental restrictions does
not promote either fairness or the preservation of reasonable investment-backed expectations. 49 It is also clear that judicial sanction
of such manipulation of property interests will increase the likelihood
of "total takings." This judicial sanction will require compensation,
and unduly stymie worthy government efforts to protect public health,
safety, and welfare through the protection of natural ecosystems.
Moreover, in the short-term, Footnote 7, alone, will trigger a plethora

45. The Majority explicitly rejects the approach to this issue taken in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. 366 N.E. 2d 1271, 1276-77 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

The court apparently rejects this approach because the "denominator" in the diminution fraction included consideration of the railroad's other property holdings "in the vicinity." Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2894, n.7. The alternative proposed by the railroad would have recognized the
airspace above Grand Central Terminal as a separate property right that had been totally taken
by the City of New York, forcing the City to pay the railroad for that lost property right.

See, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. The Majority also clearly ignores Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, which also required consideration of the parcel as a whole. 480
U.S. 470, 497-502 (1987).
46. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894, n.7.
47. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens graphically

illustrates how the segmentation of property interests could be manipulated to force compensation:
An investor may, for example, purchase the right to build a multi-family home on
a specific lot, with the result that a zoning regulation that allows only single-family
homes would render the investor's property interest 'valueless.'
Id.See also id. at 2914-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. See Frank 1. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1988); Michelman, supra note 39, at 1192-1193; Sax, supra note 39, at 60; Epstein, supra note 39, at 1518.
49. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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of artificial real estate transactions and opportunistic litigation. The
resulting transaction costs will be inefficient, undercutting a primary
function of the Just Compensation Clause: to protect and encourage
productivity. 0
Ill.

THE IMPACT OF THE TOTAL TAKINGS RULE ON WETLANDS
REGULATION

A. Wetlands Regulations Rarely Prohibit All Economically Viable
Uses of Property As a Whole
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act requires
a permit only for activities involving discharges of dredged or fill
material into waters of the United States including, but not limited
to, wetlands," l Certain "economically viable" activities can be conducted in wetlands without actually dumping fill material or moving
dirt into the wetland. For example, timber and other renewable resources can sometimes be economically harvested from wetlands without discharging dredged or fill material.5 2 In addition, landowners
can charge for the use of their wetlands for recreational activities
such as camping, fishing, birdwatching, hunting, trapping, and scientific study.53 Landowners can also sell easements or fee title interests
for these purposes. 5 4 Section 404 also includes broad exemptions for
"normal agricultural and silvicultural activities." 55 Such uses of wetlands should not constitute takings as the courts have often held that
a taking is not caused by "a mere denial of the 'highest and best
use,' i.e., most profitable use, that would be available in the absence
of regulation.'"56

50. See Michelman, supra note 39, at 1212. See also supra notes 39-42 and accompanying
text.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1988).
52. See, e.g., L.D. Harris et al. Bottomland Hardwoods: Valuable, Vanishing, Vulnerable. 1984. School of Forests Resources and Conservation, University of Florida, in cooperation
with Florida Cooperative Fish and Wildlife Research Unit and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service;
Paul F. Scodari, Wetlands Protection: The Role of Economics 9-11 (1990).
53. Id. See also Hendricks v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 143, 156-57 (1987); Loveladies
Harbor v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 395 (1988); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2909 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n of Town of Dennis, 393 N.E. 2d 858, 866
(Mass. 1979); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P. 2d 1062, 1085 (Wash. 1987).
54. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) and cases cited therein;
2919-20 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Formanek v. U.S., Mr. Formanek refused offers by
the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources to purchase the regulated wetlands, including
one offer for approximately 50% of the value of the wetlands based upon Formanek's own
appraisal. 22 ELR 20893 (Cl. Ct. May 14, 1992).
55. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1988).
56. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1987); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F. 2d 1184, 1192
(1981) cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F. 2d 1210, 1213 (1981)
cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
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The focus of the § 404 permitting program, and most state wetland regulatory programs, is not to prohibit land use, but to guide
development activity out of wetlands and other ecologically sensitive
aquatic areas.17 Even when a landowner's proposed use of his or her
land requires a § 404 permit, that permit is generally issued, insuring
the landowner's ability to put his property to an economically viable
use. The Army Corps (Corps) permit statistics demonstrate that in
1990, only 500 (3%) of the approximately 15,000 individual permit
applications were denied. Another 75,000 additional activities were
authorized by general permit,5" lowering permit denials to 0.56% of
all regulated activities.5 9
The § 404 permitting standards, known as the § 404(b)(1) guidelines, reflect the intent to steer development activity out of wetlands
and sensitive aquatic areas. 60 The regulations require that a permit
applicant first establish that there are no "practicable alternatives"
to the proposed discharge which would have "less adverse impact on
the aquatic ecosystem" and no other significant adverse environmental consequences. "Practicable" is defined as "available and capable of being done after taking into consideration cost, existing
61
technology, and logistics in light of overall project purposes.
Often, project proposals can be modified to avoid discharges into
wetlands by down-sizing or reconfiguring a development proposal.
While such alternatives may (or may not) decrease the anticipated
profit from a development, they by no means leave the subject land
parcel economically idle.62

A more difficult case arises when a practicable alternative to the
proposed project is identified on an entirely different tract of land.63
If the Corps denies a permit on this basis (a very uncommon result),

57. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
58. Section 404 general permits typically involve minimal Corps scrutiny for environmental impacts, minimal public notice and input, and minimal restrictions on regulated activities. They must, by statute, be limited to activities with minimal individual and cumulative
adverse impact. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (1988); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Nationwide
Permit Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,134 (November 22, 1991) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R.
Part 330).
59. EPA Office of Water, Office of Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds, based on FY 1990
permit statistics collected by the Corps of Engineers.
60. 40 C.F.R. Part 230 (1990).
61. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1990). See also, Memorandum of Agreement Between the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, Admin. Matls.
20 ELR 35223 (February 6, 1990) [hereinafter Mitigation MOA].
62. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envtl. Protection, 362 A.2d 948,
952 (Conn. 1975) (no taking because landowner denied a permit to fill 5.3 acres of wetlands
on his 20.6 acre lot could reapply to fill fewer wetlands which could then be combined with
the 3.1 acres of upland on his property for an economically viable use).
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. See also, Michael C. Blumm and D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence,
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the question arises as to what uses can the property be put to which
are either unregulated (such as those described above), or for which
there are no practicable alternatives in accordance with the § 404(b)(1)
guidelines. While such a permit denial should be carefully considered
by a regulatory agency prior to issuance, it must be recognized that
the permit denial is not an outright prohibition on wetland development on the site. It is a prohibition of discharges associated with
the particular proposed activity for which the agency has determined
a practicable alternative does exist.6"
If the Corps and EPA determine that there are no practicable
alternatives to discharging into wetlands or other waters, the landowner is next required to minimize the adverse impacts of his or her
activities in aquatic areas through "appropriate and practicable"
steps. 6 Again such measures typically include down-sizing and reconfiguring project elements to reduce the damage to aquatic areas.6
They also include a wide range of other practices, such as avoiding
or minimizing disruptions in water flow, reducing soil erosion into
aquatic areas, and avoiding discharges during fish spawning and nursery periods. 67 Obviously, this requirement is geared to minimizing
impacts of a development proposal, recognizing that the proposed
activity will go forward.
The third basic requirement is that the permit applicant minimize
the aquatic impacts of his or her proposed activity by compensating
for lost functions and values of wetlands and other waters, to the
extent "appropriate and practicable." 6s Usually, such compensation
takes the form of restoring, creating, or enhancing wetlands on or
in relatively close proximity to the site of the wetlands lost to the
development proposal. Clearly, compensatory wetland mitigation has
evolved as a way to allow development to go forward, while minimizing the damage resulting from widespread wetlands destruction.
Consequently, compensatory mitigation requirements should logically
69
not trigger takings claims.

Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. CoLo. L. REv. 695, 767-768 (1989)
[hereinafter Blumm and Zaleha]; Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. CoLO. L.

REv. 773 (1989).
64. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1990).

65. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (1990) and Subpart 1; see also Mitigation MOA, supra note
61.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id. See also Mitigation MOA, supra note 61, at Section II.C.3.
69. A word of caution is in order. The Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission requires that permit conditions be closely tied to the purposes the regulation is intended to advance. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). The further from the nexus of replacing
the aquatic area functions and values lost to the development proposal, the more the mitigation
conditions look like "exaction," and the less "legal cover" the regulatory agency has for its
permit decision.
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Usually, if these "sequential mitigation" requirements are met,
and the proposed discharge does not violate other substantive federal
environmental laws and state Water quality standards, the § 404 permit will be issued and the proposed use will be allowed to proceed
in accordance with permit conditions.7 0 However, there are occasions
where the Corps and/or EPA will decide that the unavoidable adverse
impacts of a proposal on wetlands and waters will be so damaging
to the aquatic ecosystem as to be unacceptable. 7 The Corps may deny
a § 404 permit on grounds that the proposed activity will cause or
contribute to the "significant degradation" of wetlands or other waters of the United States. 72 Adverse effects contributing to significant
degradation include the effects on municipal water supplies, plankton,
fish, shellfish, wildlife, and special aquatic sites, including wetlands.
Also included are adverse effects on fish and wildlife, their habitat,
loss of the capacity of a wetland to assimilate nutrients, purify water,
or reduce wave energy, adverse effects on the recreational, aesthetic,
and economic
values of wetlands and other waters of the United
73
States.
Even if the Corps decides to issue a § 404 permit in the face of
such impacts, EPA can veto the permit issuance under § 404(c). 74 The
EPA can issue a § 404(c) veto if the Administrator determines that
the proposed discharge of dredged or fill material will have an "unacceptable adverse effect" on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds
and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife,
or recreational areas. 75 "Unacceptable adverse effect" is, in turn, defined as an impact on a wetland or aquatic ecosystem which is likely
to result in "significant degradation" of municipal water supplies
(including surface or groundwater) or significant loss of, or damage
76
to fisheries, shellfishing, wildlife habitat or recreation areas.
As in the case of a denial based upon practicable alternatives,
a permit denial based on significant degradation will raise questions
about the potential for economically viable use of the regulated wetlands or waters consistent with § 404.77 Such uses may well be available, as discussed above.78 While there is some risk of a "total taking"
in such a permit denial, it must also be recognized that a Corps or

70. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1990).
71. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (1990). See also infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text;

Blumm and Zaleha, supra note 63, at 739-744.
72. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (1990).
73. Id.
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1990); see also Blumm and Zaleha, supra note 63, at 740-744.
75. Id.
76. This § 404(c) determination also considers the factors and compliance requirements
set forth in the § 404(b)(1) guidelines. 40 C.F.R. § 231.2(e) (1990).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).

78. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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EPA finding of significant degradation will usually, if not always,
involve the kind of potentially severe harm to public and private
reasonable applicainterests that should fall within "an objectively
79
tion" of nuisance and property principles.
Even in the few cases in which § 404 permits are denied and the
regulated wetlands or waters are severely restricted in their economic
use, economically viable use can still be made of the upland areas
on the property. Consequently, when the property is viewed as a
whole, there is usually no taking.8 0 In over 15 years and hundreds
of thousands of permit decisions,' a taking based on a § 404 permit
denial has been found in only three federal cases.8 2 Moreover, these
three takings decisions may not stand because they do not appear to
be consistent with existing takings law on diminution of value.83 The
decisions are all trial court decisions and two -of the three mhy be
reversed on appeal."
B. Segmentation of Property Interests Would Increase Total
Takings in Wetland Regulation Cases
Section § 404 permit conditions and denials are far more likely
to result in "total takings" if courts begin to confine their diminution
of value analysis to the particular restricted wetland or stream bed
which is part of a larger parcel of land. Judge Loren Smith's ruling

79. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2902, n.18. See also infra notes 144-193 and accompanying
text.
80. See, e.g., Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (1981) (court looked at the
value and use of the entire 10,000 acre parcel purchased and partially developed between 1964
and 1976, and determined that § 404 permit denials for two particular developments in 1976
did not deprive Deltona of the economically viable use of its land); Jentgen v. United States,
228 Cl. Ct. 527, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213 (1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Ciampitti v.
United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991).
81. See supra note 59 regarding government statistics establishing that the Corps receives
approximately 15,000 individual permit applications each year. The § 404 permit program,
enacted into law in 1972, has been actively regulating most waters of the U.S. since about
1977. See infra notes 212-213 and accompanying text. See also Blumm and Zaleha, supra note
63, at 706-710 (describing the historical evolution of the § 404 permitting program).
82. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990); Formanek v. United States, 22 ELR 20893 (Cl.
Ct. May 14, 1992).
83. For example, in Formanek, not only did the Court allow "segmentation" of certain
access and fee title property rights to maximize the potential for severe diminution in value,
the Court also ignored the market for the property as a nature preserve (approximately $500,000),
and ignored a proven alternative access, ensuring economically viable use of the 12+ unrestricted upland acres on the property. In addition, the Court attached a 35% rate of return on
equity to the 65.8 acres of developable land on the property, some of which was apparently
upland. 22 ELR 20893 (Cl. Ct. May 14, 1992).
84. Florida Rock Indus., 21 Cl. Ct. at 160; Loveladies Harbor. Inc., 21 Cl. Ct. at 153;
Formanek, 22 ELR at 20893.
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in Loveladies Harbor5 is a case in point. In that case, plaintiffs purchased for $300,000 a 250 acre parcel of land in coastal New Jersey
in 1956. They developed and sold homes on 199 acres of the 250 acre
parcel at a healthy profit.8 6 Yet, Judge Smith focused exclusively on
the 12.5 wetland acres subject to a § 404 permit denial. Judge Smith
ignored the plaintiffs' intensive economic use of the remaining 80%
of the parcel and ignored the potential economically viable recreational uses which could be made on the wetlands themselves. Judge
Smith found a taking, and ordered the payment of $2,658,000 plus
interest in compensation.8 7 This decision is clearly contrary to the
binding precedent in Deltona Corp.8" The Loveladies decision also
clearly fails to strike a balance between satisfying the developer's
"reasonable investment-backed expectations" and furthering the collective goals of protecting remaining coastal New Jersey wetlands.8 9
The Formanek" decision also illustrates how segmenting property
interests can undermine the collective goal of protecting wetlands. Mr.
Formanek owned a 3/4 interest in a 160 acre land parcel in Savage
Minnesota in 1966. 91 The trial court found that the property at issue
in the case consisted of 12 upland acres and 99 wetland acres. 92 In
1979, Mr. Formanek was informed that the wetland area was part
of the Savage Fen Wetland Complex and included an ecologically
rare and sensitive calcareous fen plant community. 93 In the early 1980's,
the Minnesota State Natural Heritage Program offered to buy Formanek's property for $590,000, approximately 50076 of Formanek's
own appraisal. Negotiations broke down and were terminated sometime around 1983 or 1984. 94
In November 1983, the Corps of Engineers determined that fill
activity in a core 40-acre portion of the fen on Formanek's property
would require an individual § 404 permit application, and could not
be authorized simply by general permit. 9 In 1984, Mr. Formanek
sold a portion of his land, either fortuitously or strategically losing
in the bargain his access to the 12 acres of unregulated upland on
his property.9 In March 1985, the Corps extended its individual per-

85. Loveladies Harbor. Inc., 21 CI. Ct. at 153.
86. Id. See also David Coursen, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Indirection
in the Evolution of Takings Law, 22 ELR 10778. 10783 n. 77 (Dec. 1992).
87. Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 21 C1. Ct. at 153.
88. Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (1981). See also Tabb Lakes, Inc. v.
United States, 26 C1. Ct. 1334, 1345-46 n.17 (1992).
89. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
90. Formanek, supra note 82.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.at 20894.
96. Id.
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mit requirement over all of Formanek's wetland acreage. 97 In October
1985, Formanek applied for a § 404 permit to build an access road
to his uplands. 98 The Corps denied the permit for the access road,
not for any other site development activity. 99 Litigation followed shortly
thereafter. 100
The Court's taking decision ultimately turned, in large part, on
the quality of access to the upland portion of the site.' 0' The Formanek chronology certainly suggests the possibility that Mr. Formanek could have manipulated his property holdings to force the
government into a choice between a possible taking or granting Formanek a new, preferred access right through the precious fen. °2 Even
if the 1984 sale precluding access to Formanek's access was not premeditated, it certainly suggests the potential for strategic abuse.
Clearly, if Courts allow property owners to artificially segment
land into the discrete wetland property interests which are restricted,
"total takings" of those discrete interests will become more frequent.
Such a result seems likely to hamstring the regulatory program and
the courts with compensation claims that will rarely be warranted,
either to protect reasonable investment-backed expectations or to
achieve a fair and just result. 03
IV.

A.

THE

MAJORITY'S NUISANCE AND PROPERTY LAW EXCEPTION

The Holding

Having decided that "the South Carolina Supreme Court was
too quick to conclude that [the nuisance] principle decides the present
case," the second prong of the Lucas decision attempts to apply the
"nuisance exception" to its categorical "total takings" rule. 14 The
Majority rejects the "harmful or noxious uses" principle as nothing
more than an early articulation of what is now a broad State police
power to regulate without an obligation to compensate. The Court
concludes that the distinction between regulations that "prevent harm"
and regulations that "confer benefit" is often difficult to determine
on an objective basis. 105 Accordingly, the Lucas Majority rejects legislative pronouncements of harm prevention as sufficient justification

97. Id.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20895.
Id. at 20896.
See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896-97.
Id. at 2897-99.
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for avoiding compensation when all economically viable use of land
is prohibited. ,06
The Majority then holds that, where a "total taking" occurs,
the government can avoid compensation only where the proscribed
use interests were not part of his title to begin with:
Any limitation so severe [as to effect a "total taking"] cannot
be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of7 property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership. 1
But what are these "background principles" of state property
and nuisance law? The Majority suggests a limitation on the nuisance
and property law exception to those situations that "merely duplicate
the results that could be achieved in the courts."'10 However, the
Court's own analysis belies such a strict interpretation. The very reference to "background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance" potentially allows, for consideration of a broad range of
tort and property law principles beyond common law nuisance.'°9 The
Court's allowance for State exercise of its police power "to forestall
other grave threats to the lives and property of others" also suggests
a potentially broad exception to the Court's categorical compensation
requirement." 0
To help clarify its reference to background principles of nuisance
and property law, the Court offers the example of a landowner denied
a permit to conduct a landfilling operation that would result in downstream flooding of other landowners. According to the Majority, the
'landowner is not entitled to compensation for governmental restrictions on this use of land."' Similarly, the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant is not entitled to compensation when it is
required to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery
that the plant is located on an earthquake fault." 2
The Court reasons that these land uses, which are now explicitly
prohibited under a state or federal law such as FWPCA § 404, were
always implicitly unlawful under state "background principles of
property and nuisance law."'' Yet, because the Court's examples

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.

Id. at 2899.
Id. at 2900.
Id.
See infra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 n.16.
Id. at 2900-01.
Id. at 2900.
Id.at 2901.
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both involve prohibitions on land use to prevent future harm, it is
questionable whether a state court would actually find a nuisance at
common law and enjoin the challenged land use. 1 4 The Court's analysis must indeed envision the application of broad principles of nuisance and property law, rather than a strict application of the common
law.
The Majority cites Michelman in support of its notion that prohibitions are not takings where legislation simply makes explicit an
already implicit background restriction." 5 However, Michelman's
analysis is not limited to prohibitions which were implicit in "background principles of nuisance and property law." Michelman argues
more broadly that investment-backed expectations are not reasonable
for:
[ilnvestments which, when they were made, either (a) interrupted someone else's enjoyment of an economic good, as
should have been apparent; or (b) were of a sort which society
had adequately made known should not become the object of
expectations of continuing enjoyment." 6
According to Michelman, then, property interests are not protected when they interfere with another's property interests, as in the
case of noxious or' nuisance-like uses of land. Property interests are
also not protected where society has given adequate notice to landowners that it is "preempt[ing] the exploitation of a certain narrowly
described class of resources . . . and that no one is to form any
inconsistent expectations about the future use and control of those
resources." "17 This notice can be implicit or explicit." 8
Justices Kennedy, Blackmun and Stevens interpret the Majority
opinion as rejecting legislatively-articulated nuisance and property

114. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826, 827 (1977). The Restatement
nuisance analysis emphasizes, particularly in the absence of a nuisance statute, the necessity
of proving an unreasonable interference which, in turn, is based on proof of substantial harm.
Future substantial harm is, of course, far more difficult to prove than tangible, physical damage
that has already occurred.
115. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01 (citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1165, 1239-1241 (1967)).
116. Michelman, supra note 39, at 1239-1241.

117. Id. at 1240.
118. Id. at 1240. For example, the U.S. Government's dominant interest in navigable
waters, leaving private vested rights in navigable waters noncompensable. Id. n.128 (citing U.S.
v. Chandler-Dunbar Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62-64 (1913) (Supreme Court found it "inconceivable" that anyone should acquire a vested right to exploit the navigable waters of the
nation); U.S. v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950) ("There . . . has been
ample notice over the years that such property is subject to a dominant public interest"). One
might ask why current or future governmental declarations of the public's interest in all "waters
of the U.S." (e.g., wetlands) should not have the same effect.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1993

19

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 28 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 1
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVIII

principles, and recognizing only judge-made law. 1 9 Yet, as discussed
above, the Majority's analysis and the Michelman reasoning relied20
upon by the Majority certainly do not support such a restriction.'
The Majority does not clearly define its "background principles
of nuisance and property law." However, the Court does set forth
a required "total takings" inquiry which must analyze:
(1) the degree of harm to public resources, ol adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities;
(2) the social value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to the locality in question; and
(3) the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be
avoided through measures taken by the claimant 121
and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike.
B.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts Nuisance Inquiry

Turning to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance, §
826 provides that a nuisance occurs when either:
(1) the gravity of the harm (in this case, to public resources)
outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct; or (2) fhe harm
caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of
compensating for such harm would not make the actor's conduct infeasible. This balancing of harm versus utility depends
upon the particular facts in each case and is normally made
by the trier of fact upon a thorough consideration of the factors stated in §§ 827 and 828.122
Section 826(e) also notes that, with respect to some types of
conduct, there has been a "crystallization of legal opinion as to the
gravity of harm versus utility equation, rendering certain conduct unreasonable and therefore a nuisance as a matter of law. This crystallization may appear in the form of a legislative enactment or it
may be the result of a series of judicial decisions . . . .These judicial
crystallization, however, . . . are applied only in particular fact si-

tuations and are constantly re-examined in the light of changing com-

119. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Id. at 2920-21 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 2915 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 121-131 and

accompanying text.
121. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2901 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(1977)).

OF

TORTS,

§§

826-28, 830

122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(e) (1977).
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munity conditions and views." The Restatement itself thus clearly
considers the legislature as playing an active role in formulating nuisance law and, in any event, sees the gravity of harm versus utility
balance as evolving 23over time "in light of changing community standards and views."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 827 requires that the gravity of
harm side of the balance consider all relevant factors, including the
following:
(1) the extent of the harm;
(2) the character of the harm;
(3) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use
invaded (here, the social value of the public resource);
(4) the suitability of the use invaded to the locality; and
(5) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
The gravity of the harm may be found to be so severe that it does
not require compensation regardless of the utility of the proposed

conduct. 124
On the other side of the balance is the social value, or utility,
of the claimant's conduct. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 828
identifies three important factors in this analysis:
(1) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct;
(2) the suitability of the conduct to the locality; 25and
(3) the impracticability of avoiding the invasion.1
In determining social value of the primary purpose of the conduct,
the court will consider "in each case the community standards of
relative social value prevailing at the time and place, and also what
courts have traditionally regarded
as the relative social value of var2 6
ious types of human activity."'
123. Id. cmt. e. See also William L. Prosser, PrivateAction for Public Nuisance, 52 VA.
L. REv. 997, 999-1000 (1966).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. b (1977). Restatement § 827 cmt. f
provides the following guidance with respect to the social value of the public resource:
Uses of land for residential, agricultural, business, industrial, recreational or other
beneficial purposes have a general or intrinsic social value. They are essential to the
functioning of organized society and substantial interferences with them under almost
any circumstances are relatively serious. How much social value a particular type of
use has in comparison with other types of use depends upon the extent to which
that type of use advances or protects the general public good. (See §828, Comment
e). The greater the general social value of the particular type of use or enjoyment
of land which is invaded, the greater the gravity of the harm from the invasion.
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1977).
126. Id. cmt. f. The primary purpose of the conduct has social value "if the general public
good is in some way advanced or protected by the encouragement and achievement of the
purpose. It does not have social value if the general public good is impaired by the encouragement or achievement of the purpose." Id. cmt. e.
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Avoidance is the third major factor in the Majority's "total takings" inquiry. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 828(h) explains the
avoidance factor as follows:
When a person knows that his conduct will interfere with another's use or enjoyment of land and it would be practicable
for him to prevent or avoid part or all of the interference and
still achieve his purpose, his conduct lacks utility if he fails
to take the necessary measures to avoid it. It is only when an
intentional invasion is practically unavoidable that one can be
he is not justified if the
justified in causing it; and even then,
27
gravity of the harm is too great.1
With respect to the suitability of the use to its locality, the Court
notes that when particular conduct has been engaged in over a long
period by similarly situated owners, there is usually not a commonlaw prohibition, though "changed circumstances or new knowledge
may make what was previously permissible no longer so.' ' 2 Moreover, if other similarly situated owners are permitted to continue the
use denied 1to29 the claimant, there is also usually not a common-law
prohibition.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts thus suggests that a nuisance
determination is based in large part on a case-by-case legal balancing
of the social value of the public resource being protected, versus the
social value of the restricted land use. 30 Both the Restatement and
Prosser suggest that both judge-made law and legislation should form
the basis for these judgments. 3'
Using the Restatement as an interpretive guide, the Majority seems
to hold that the government need not compensate the landowner for
a "total taking" if it establishes that the public harm likely to be
caused by the particular prohibited land use outweighs the utility of
the prohibited land use in the circumstances in which the land is
presently found.'3 2 Such a reading is consistent with the Court's apparent interest in forcing a more careful, case-specific balancing of
public harm and private utility by the South Carolina Supreme Court
in the instant case.' 33 In addition, this reading is not a significant

127. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 827 cmt. e, 830 (1977).
128. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.

129. Id.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 826-831 (1977).
131. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.

132. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02 and n.18.
133. Id.
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departure from existing takings jurisprudence. 3 4 Moreover, this reading of the Majority's nuisance exception strikes a careful balance
between the goal of protecting reasonable investment-backed expectations on the one hand, and respecting governmental efforts
3 5 to protect wetlands and other natural ecosystems on the other.
C. Other Property Law Principles
Beyond the analysis of nuisance principles, there are other principles of property law that may limit the use of land. According to
the Majority's reasoning, these principles also would preclude a compensation requirement where the challenged governmental restriction
merely made explicit a restriction that was already implicit in state
property law. 36 Applying Michelman's analysis, any property statute
or common law that clearly signaled the preemption of "the exploitation of a certain narrowly described
class of resources" should
137
act as a restriction on future land use.
In particular, public trust rights such as those in navigable and
tidal waters should now clearly be recognized as an inherent title
restriction which is not "taken" when a government restriction explicitly precludes destruction of public trust resources.' 38 The public
may also have "prescriptive rights" in private lands that may limit
private land use rights. A prescriptive right is acquired where there
is open and continuous use for an extended period with the landowner's knowledge. 139
Other state property principles, such as the doctrine of implied
warranty of suitability or habitability, might also constitute a background principle of property law that inherently restricts specific land

134. Most Supreme Court decisions relying on the harmful or noxious use abatement
principle involved a similar balancing of public harm versus private utility. See, e.g. Goldblatt
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The Lucas decision
may, however, more clearly define a governmental burden of proving nuisance where a "total
taking" is found to occur.
135. See discussion of reasonable investment-backed expectations, supra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
136. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.

137. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 477 (1988); Graham v.
Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380-83 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied sub. nom. Taylor
v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1983 (1981); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P 2d 1062 (Wash. 1987); cert.
denied sub nom Orion Corp.v. Washington, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988); Just v. Marinette, 201 N.W.
2d 761 (Wis. 1972). See also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
139. Jon Kusler, Public Liability and Natural Hazards: The Common Law and Regulatory
Takings, Omni Press, for the National Science Foundation. (forthcoming 1993; manuscript
currently available from Association of State Wetland Managers, Box 2463 Berne, New York
12023) [hereinafter Kusler]. See, e.8., Rendler v. Lincoln County, 709 P. 2d 721, 726-27 (Or.
Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 728 P.2d 21 (Or. 1986); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W. 2d 95 (Tex. Ct.

App. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987).
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uses contrary to such a warranty.' 4° In many states, new home buyers
may rescind sales or obtain damages if lands purchased are subject4
to flooding or are otherwise not suitable for their intended uses.' '
Finally, additional tort restrictions on land use, such as trespass, negligent conduct, and strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
42
might well preclude requirements for governmental compensation.
As with the nuisance inquiry, if the Majority opinion is read to
recognize these property principles as inherent restrictions on land
use, the opinion strikes a balance that accommodates reasonable investment-backed expectations without crippling government efforts to
protect wetlands and other natural ecosystems. In contrast, the Lucas
decision would be a departure from current takings law, current nuisance and property law, and good public policy, if it is interpreted
as actually confining the analysis of "background principles of nuisance and property law" to judge-made common law. Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, and Stevens all challenge such a limitation as "too
of regulatory power in a complex
narrow a confine for the exercise
43
and interdependent society."
V.'

WETLANDS RESTRICTIONS

WILL OFTEN FALL WITHIN THE

NUISANCE AND PROPERTY LAW EXCEPTION

A.

General Common Law Nuisance and Property Law Principles

The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 821D defines a private nuisance as a "nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in
1
A landowner is liable for
the private use and enjoyment of land."'"

140. Id.
141. Id. See, e.g., Jordan v. Talaga, 532 N. 2d 1174 (1989); Gilmore v. Garrett, 582 So.
2d 387 (Miss. 1991); Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 154 N.W. 2d 803 (1967);
Beri, Inc. v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 580 P. 2d 173 (Or. 1978).
142. Kusler, supra note 139.
143. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Id. at 2915 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 2920-22 nn.5-6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Stevens, the Court's holding freezes the State's common law and
denies the legislature its traditional power to revise property law, contrary to Supreme Court
precedent which recognized that "the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common
law as they are developed, and to adapt itto the changes of time and circumstances." Id. at
2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877)). Justice Stevens
also cautions that "arresting the development of the common law" is "profoundly unwise":
The human condition is one of constant learning and evolution - both moral and
practical. Legislatures implement that new learning; in doing so they must often revise
the definition of property and the rights of property owners. Thus, when the Nation
came to understand that slavery was morally wrong and mandated the emancipation
of all slaves, it, in effect, redefined "property." On a lesser scale, our on-going selfeducation produces similar changes in the rights of property owners: New appreciation
of the significance of endangered species, the importance of wetlands, and the vulnerability of coastal lands, shapes our evolving understandings of property rights.
Id. at 2921.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977).
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a private nuisance if his conduct amounts to an intentional and unreasonable invasion, or an unintentional invasion otherwise actionable
under liability rules for negligent conduct, reckless conduct, or strict
liability. 4 1 Whether an intentional invasion is unreasonable is determined in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections
826-831, as discussed above.'
47
These rules are generally applicable to public nuisances as well.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B defines a public nuisance
as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public." Conduct which involves a "significant interference with the
public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort
or the public convenience" may constitute a public nuisance.'4 Also
important to the determination is whether the conduct "is proscribed
by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation," and whether
the conduct is "of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent
or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or 4has
reason to know,
' 9
has a significant effect upon the public right." '
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 856(g) defines "public rights
in water" as "legally protected rights to use navigable and other
public waters for transportation, pleasure boating, fishing, swimming,
skating, hunting and other purposes."'5 0 In some states, these public
rights have greater legal protection as absolute property rights under
the state's public trust doctrine.' 5'
B. Nuisances and Public Rights Violations Arising from the
Pollution of Waters
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 832 states that,"[a]n invasion
of one's interest in the use and enjoyment of land or water resulting
from another's pollution of surface waters, ground waters or water
in watercourses and lakes may constitute a nuisance under the rules
stated in Sections 821A-831 of this Chapter."'15 2 This rule applies to
both private and public nuisances. Section 832(c) defines the pollution
of water as:
[Tihe alteration of its physical, chemical, or biological qualities so as to make it harmful to domestic, commercial, in-

145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977).

146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra notes 122-129 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B(e), 826-31 (1977).
Id.
Id.

150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 856(g) (1977). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 821B(g) (1977).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 856(g) (1977). See also cases cited supra note 138
and accompanying text.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 832 (1977).
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dustrial, agricultural, recreational or other beneficial uses of
water or uses of land, or detrimental to public health, safety
and welfare or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other
aquatic life.' 3
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 849(e) specifically provides that,
"[t]here is no riparian right or privilege to pollute water, nor do
landowners have rights to pollute surface or ground water found on
or within their land.' 54 Water pollution which kills fish in a public
stream has long been recognized as a public nuisance at common
law. 5' Water pollution has also been found a private nuisance at
5
common law.

6

Wetlands drainage and filling often increase water pollution by
channeling sediment, fertilizers, and other chemicals from uplands
and wetlands into streams, lakes, rivers, and estuaries.'5 7 Such reductions in water quality can, in turn, cause significant declines in
fish populations, affecting both commercial and sport fishing indusThe draining and development of the freshwater "pocosin"
tries.'
wetlands along the coast of North Carolina illustrate the relationship
between wetland conversion and lost fishing rights.
Natural pocosin wetlands slow down and diffuse the influx of
fresh water storm run off into coastal streams and bays that contain
saline water and support marine life, allowing these coastal waters
to gradually assimilate the fresh water without drastic fluctuations in
salinity. 59 This buffering capacity is 10ost when pocosins are drained
and an artificial drainage system chftnnels the freshwater runoff rapidly and directly to coastal waters. Introduced in such concentration
to coastal waters, this freshwater runoff can actually become a pol6
lutant, significantly harming shrimp and other marine organisms.1 0
When pocosin wetlands are cleared, drained, and converted to
other land uses, the normally acidic and nutrient poor soil is often

153. Id. at § 832(c).
154. Id. at § 849(e).
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 832(b) (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS. § 88, at 583-590 n.57 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser].
156. See Prosser, supra note 155, § 89, at 601 n.36.
157. See Daniel, infra notes 159-63.
158. See infra notes 164-67.
159. CHARLES C. DAMIEL, III, Hydrology, Geology, and Soils of Pocosins:A Comparison
of Natural and Altered Systems PocosiN WETLANDS, AN INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF COASTAL
PLAIN FRESHWATER BOGS IN NORTH CAROLINA 100-101 (Curtis J. Richardson ed. 1981) [hereinafter Daniel]; MICHAEL STREET AND JOSEPH MCCLEES, North Carolina's Coastal Fishing In-

dustry and the Influence of Coastal Alterations, PocosIN WETLANDS, AN INTEGRATED ANALYSIS
OF COASTAL PLAIN FRESHWATER Boos IN NORTH CAROLINA 238-251 (Curtis J. Richardson ed.
1981) [hereafter Street and McClees].
160. Daniel, supra note 159 at 100-01; Street & McClees, supra note 159 at 238-51.
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treated to prepare it for these new uses.' 6' The freshwater runoff
rapidly channeled into coastal streams and bays also carries with it
excess nutrients such as magnesium, calcium, bicarbonate, sulfate,6
nitrate nitrogen, phosphorus, and additional suspended sediments.
This run off can result in algal growth, eutrophication, and
ultimate
16

disruption of the marine habitat along the coastal fringe.
In 1978, North Carolina's commercial and recreational fishing
industry contributed more than $325 million to the coastal economy,
and employed over 23,000 persons.' 4 Estuarine-dependent species,
such as Atlantic croaker, menhaden, penaeid shrimp, blue crab, and
oysters accounted for more than 90% of the commercial landings
from 1974 to 1978.165 Brown shrimp, in particular, but possibly oysters, crabs, and finfish as well, are highly susceptible to salinity
changes. Drainage of North Carolina's pocosins and other freshwater
wetlands is a suspected cause of reductions in North Carolina's shrimp
and oyster production, as well as other problems with North Carolina
fisheries. 66 The relationship between wetland conversion and fishery
declines has also been convincingly traced in such places as Florida's
Apalachicola River and the Everglades, the Chesapeake Bay, and the
67
rivers and estuaries of the Pacific Northwest.
C.

Wildlife Habitat

life.

Wetlands provide critical habitat for a wide diversity of animal
6
1 Wetlands drainage and filling has also destroyed the habitat

161. Daniel, supra note 159, at 101-04; CuRTis J. RICHARDSON, Pocosin WETLANDS, AN
INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF COASTAL PLAIN FRESHWATER BOGS IN NORTH CAROLINA" 135, 141
(Richardson ed. 1981).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. STREET AND MCCLEES, supra note 159, at 238-39.
165. STREET AND MCCLEES, supra note 159, at 244.
166. STREET AND MCCLEES, supra note 159, at 247-249; Sandra L. Postel, The Economic
Benefits of Pocosin Preservation [hereinafter Postel] in Pocosn WETLANDS, AN INTEGRATED
ANALYSIS OF COASTAL PLAIN FRESHWATER BOoS IN NORTH CAROLINA 283, 290-91 (Richardson
ed. 1981).
167. Environmental Defense Fund and World Wildlife Fund, How Wet is a Wetland? 4452 (1992)[hereinafter How Wet is a Wetland]; J.R.Chambers, in press. Coastal Degradation
and Fish Population Losses. National Marine Fisheries Service, Washington, D.C.; Hinman,
K. Stemming the Tide (1991). National Coalition for Marine Conservation. Savannah, GA. 35
pp.; Fisheries in Crisis: Making the Habitat Connection. 1990. The National Fisherman. Portland, Maine.
168. See, e.g., Harris ET AL, supra, at n.42; Harris and Gosselink, Cumulative Impacts
of Bottomland Hardwood Conversion on Wildlife, Hydrology, and Water Quality, EPA. 1986
[hereinafter Harris and Gosselink]; Charles H. Wharton et al., The Fauna of Bottomland
Hardwoods in the Southeastern United States, in "Wetlands of Bottomland Hardwood Forests"
87-127 (Clark and Benforado eds. 1981) [hereinafter Wharton]; Tom Monschein, Values of
Pocosins to Game and Fish Species in North Carolina, in PocosIN WETLANDS, AN INTEGRATED
ANALYSIS OF COASTAL PLAIN FRESHWATER Boos IN NORTH CAROLINA 155-70 (Curtis J. Richardson ed. 1981) [hereinafter Monschein]; How Wet is a Wetland?, supra note 167, at 5257.
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of numerous species of wildlife. Waterfowl and other migratory bird
populations have declined precipitously as wetlands have been drained
and filled. 69 Over 30076 of the federally-protected threatened and endangered species are wetlands dependent. 170 Wetlands conversion has
been a significant, and in some cases the exclusive factor, in bringing
many of these species to the brink of extinction. 71 In many states,
the common law already recognizes wildlife as a public trust resource
which the state has both the right and the duty to protect. 172 Consequently, wetlands conversion which results in the loss of valuable
wildlife habitat may well constitute either a common law nuisance or
violation of a common law public property right.
D. Nuisances Arising from Interference with the Flow of Surface
Waters

The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 833 provides that,
"[a]n invasion of one's interest in the use and enjoyment of land
resulting from another's interference with the flow of surface water3
may constitute a nuisance under the rules stated in §§ 821A-831 .111
At a bare minimum, there is the type of wetlands use even the Majority acknowledges as "previously impermissible" under relevant
nuisance and property principles: the case where the landowner is
the filling would cause
denied a permit to fill in a lake bed where
74
the flooding of downstream property.'
Flooding from wetlands drainage and filling is by no means an
isolated event. Wetlands provide extremely important natural flood
storage capacity.171 When wetlands are drained or filled, water from
169. See How Wet is a wetland?, supra note 167, at 32-36, 61-62, and 91-93; Tiner,
Wetlands of the United States: Current Status and Recent Trends. U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Wetlands Inventory. GPO: 1984-439-855-814/10870. 59 pp.; 1990 Status of
Waterfowl and Fall Flight Forecast. 1990. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C.,
p. 45.
170. See Feierabend, Endangered Species, Endangered Wetlands: Life on the Edge. National Wildlife Federation (Sept. 1992); How Wet is a Wetland?, supra note 167, at 52-57;
Aquatic Animals. EndangermentAlert. The Nature Conservancy Magazine. March/April 1991
[hereinafter Aquatic Animals].
171. Id.
172. See Michael J. Bean, THE EvoLurioN OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 37-47 (1983); In
re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
173. Interference with the flow of surface water may also constitute a public nuisance if
there is an invasion of a public right. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 (1977).

"In-

terference with the flow of surface waters" is defined as "an obstruction, diversion or alteration
of the natural or normal flow of surface waters in the particular place where the interference
occurs." Id. at § 833(b).
174. Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900-01 (1992). Situations
such as this may also be impermissible (and therefore not warranting compensation) on negligence or trespass grounds. See Kusler, supra note 139.
175. See, e.g., How Wet is a Wetland?, supra note 167, at 36-39; Hubbard and Linder,
Spring runoff retention in prairie pothole wetlands, 41 J. Soil and Water Cons. 2:122-125
(1986); Ludden, Er AL., Water storage capacity of natural wetland depressions in the Devils
Lake Basin of North Dakota. 38 J. SoIL AND WATER CONS. 1: 45-48(1983).
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spring runoff and storm events is no longer stored in wetlands, but
run directly overland or into streams causing nearby flooding. There
disputes over floodare literally thousands of reported cases involving
76
ing from wetlands drainage and filling.
In the celebrated § 404 enforcement case, Pozsgai v. U.S.,
Mr.
Pozsgai's filling of wetlands on his property flooded his neighbors'
yards and basements, causing significant property damage. 78 Research in North and South Dakota confirms that agricultural wetlands
drainage upstream causes downstream flooding. 7 9 Downstream farmers on the Lower Wabash River complain to theit congressional representative about increased flooding from upstream wetland
drainage.8 0
Flooding attributable to wetland development is cognizable as a
public nuisance as well. Such flooding can destroy public highways,
bridges, and other infrastructure, forcing public expenditures to repair
the damage and to prevent future flood damage.'8 ' The Minnesota
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) estimates that it costs $300
to replace each acre-foot of flood storage lost due to wetlands con-

version.

12

A prominent Florida real estate developer, insistent on building
a large planned community in wetlands on the eastern edge of the
Florida Everglades, ended up saddling its unwary purchasers and the
community with a huge bill for flood control and water supply.8 3

176. Kusler, supra note 139. Indeed, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833(b) illustrates
its definition of interference with surface water flow as follows: When one person drains or
cultivates his land, grades it or builds roads, structures or embankments upon it, he usually
interferes with the flow of surface waters upon or across it; and this interference often causes
harm to a neighbor in the use and enjoyment of his land. That harm may arise from the
backing up of water on the neighbors land or from an increase in the flow of the water or
from a change in its direction or velocity. Id.
177. See U.S. v. Pozsgai, No. 88 Crim. 00450 (D. Pa. July 13, 1989).
178. Id. In another publicized case, a Georgia developer filled in a bald cypress swamp
to build new homes in violation of § 404 and flooded the property of adjacent landowners.
See WASH. POST, May 1I, 1991; Moyer and Feierabend, STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL WfLDLIFE
FEDERATION BEFORE rHE SUBCOMMTrEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF THE SENATE ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE ON WETLANDS PROTECTION AND FEDERAL WETLANDS
LEGISLATION (Summer 1991).
179. L.J. Brun, ET AL. Stream Flow Changes in the Southern Red River Valley of North
Dakota, 38 N.D. FARM RES. 5, 11-14 (1981); D.E. Hubbard & R.L Linder, Spring Run-off
Retention in Prairie Pothole Wetlands, 41 SoI. AND WATER CONS. 2:122-125 (1986); A.P.
Ludden, ET AL. Water storage capacity of natural wetland depressions in the Devils Lake Basin
of North Dakota, 38 SoIL AND WATER CONS. 1:45-48 (1983).
180. Interview with John Divine, Staff Assistant to Indiana Congressman Frank McCloskey
(March, 1992).
181. See supra notes 179 and infra note 182 and accompanying text.
182. Testimony presented by Ron Narang, Director, Division of Waters, to the Domestic
Policy Council's Wetlands Task Force. Bismark, North Dakota, August 17, 1990.
183. John deGroot & Chuck Clark. Should This City Have Been Built? SUNSHINE: THE
MAGAZINE OF SOUTH FLORIDA, September 15, 1991/No. 415. at 6 [hereinafter deGroot & Clark].
Fact situations such as these might give rise to violation of an implied warranty of suitability
under state law. See Kusler, supra note 139.
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An elaborate flood control system was required to pump water off
the wet home sites, and a deeper brackish water source had to be
substituted for the shallow freshwater aquifer source.' 4 The freshwater aquifer, which had been recharged by the wetlands prior to
their destruction, could no longer supply water to the new homeowners.'1 5 The community
is now faced with a $600 million debt and
increased utility bills.18 6
Clearly, many wetland conversions cause the types of water pollution, habitat destruction, flooding, and groundwater depletion harms
to public and private interests that have long been recognized as nuisance or other property rights violations at common law.
E. Wetlands Regulation Under a Restatement Nuisance and
Broader Property Law Inquiry
While water pollution, flooding, groundwater depletion, and loss
of fish and waterfowl populations are harms recognized as "impermissible" under the common law of many states, other harms resulting from wetlands destruction may not be well-established in the
state's common law. Under the Restatement nuisance analysis and a
"Michelman" view of background property principles, a court could
apply a harm versus utility balancing test, taking into account existing
state and federal statutes. Through this analysis, the court could determine that an activity was restricted prior to obtaining title, either
implicitly or explicitly, as a nuisance or a violation of another countervailing property right. 8 7 In this way, activities which are newlyrecognized as harmful, based upon new scientific information, might
still be cognizable as nuisances or property right violations which do
not warrant compensation when restricted.
The conversion of seasonal wetlands, such as Southern California's vernal pools and Southwest Texas' playa lakes, offers an illustration. On these arid lands, seasonal wetlands support diverse plant
and animal communities dependent upon the moisture they provide
in the 'winter and spring.' Widespread destruction of these seasonal
wetlands has brought some of these plant and animal species to the
brink of extinction. 89 Continued destruction will eventually extinguish
these species, negating public expenditures to recover their popula-

184. deGroot and Clark, supra note 183.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 111-143 and accompanying text.
188. How Wet is a Wetland?, supra note 167, at 54-57, 141. See also, Aquatic Animals,
supra note 170.
189. 1d.
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tions. The biological diversity and abundance of flora and fauna will
decline in these arid regions.' 90
The social utility of agricultural operations threatening these wetlands is limited by the relative ease with which these ecological harms
can often be avoided. Farming and ranching operations can often
avoid destroying these wetlands by working around them, fencing
them from livestock to prevent overgrazing, and, where necessary,
leaving a buffer area to avoid chemical and sediment run-off into
them.
Under a Restatement nuisance test, a good case can be made
that agricultural production destroying these seasonal wetlands is an
unreasonable interference with a public right, i.e., a public nuisance.
The public interest in preserving the biological diversity and abundance of flora and fauna supported by these wetlands outweighs the
utility of the agricultural production on these seasonal wetlands. In
many cases, the public harm is one that is most easily avoided by
the agricultural producer, and many of these seasonal wetland areas
are not suitable for agriculture in any event. 19' Consequently, compensation would not be warranted because the destruction of natural
wetlands supporting diverse plant and animal species would be found
to be a nuisance, a land use which was already implicitly prohibited
under prevailing tort law. 92
F: The § 404(b)(1) Guidelines and the Corps' Permit Regulations
Mirror the Restatement Nuisance and Public Rights Inquiries
The Clean Water Act in general, and § 404 in particular, are
designed to protect the same public resources so highly valued in the
common law of nuisance and the public trust doctrine. The primary
objective of the CWA is to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."193 Specific goals
articulated throughout the CWA are to maintain and improve the
aquatic environment to provide for "the protection and propagation
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife," to provide for recreation, and to

190. Id.
191. Because agricultural operations should be able to proceed around vernal pools and
playa lakes, wetland and endangered species restrictions on the conversion of these seasonal
wetlands to agriculture should not be deemed a "total taking" if the parcel is viewed as a

whole, and the takings inquiry need not ever even reach the inquiry into the nuisance and
property law exception. However, if the courts permit the agricultural producer to claim a total
taking of the regulated wetlands only, then a court could find a total diminution in value, and
the nuisance and property law exception would then be pertinent.
192. Similarly, the argument might be made that the vernal pool and playa lake wetlands
and the unique flora and fauna they support are public trust resources that the landowner
never owned the right to destroy. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
193. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
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protect public water supplies. 94 The aquatic resources and public rights
which the CWA attempts to protect are remarkably similar to those
described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts definitions of water
pollution, nuisance arising from water pollution, and public rights in
water.195
The § 404(b)(1) guidelines for permit review incorporate a "public harm versus private utility" balancing test very similar to the Restatement nuisance analysis described in Lucas. 196 First, the guidelines
accord a higher social and ecological value to "special aquatic sites"
including wetlands, which the guidelines define as geographic areas
"[plossessing special ecological characteristics of productivity, habitat, wildlife protection, or other important and easily disrupted ecological values . . . [and] significantly influencing or positively

contributing to the general overall environmental health or vitality of
the entire ecosystem of a region."' 9 7
Second, the § 404 guidelines' "alternatives test" clearly balances
the public harm attributable to wetlands destruction against the basic
purposes of the proposed wetland conversion activity. 19 This "alternatives test" requires permit denial where the permit applicant has
a "practicable alternative" that would achieve his or her basic purpose without destroying the wetland.' 99 If the Corps and EPA determine that there is no available "practicable alternative" to the
proposed activity in wetlands, typically the permit is issued unless the
wetland destruction is expected to cause the "significant degradation"
of the aquatic environment. 20° This scenario also mirrors the Restatement balancing test, which states that the gravity of the public
harm may be so great as to outweigh any private land use, regardless
0
of its utility. 2 '
Similarly, the Corps' permit regulations employ a "public interest
review" that explicitly balances the public harm attributable to wetlands destruction against the need for and utility of the proposed

194. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1252(a), 1313(c)(2)(a),

1314(A)(2), 1343(C)(a), and

1344(c) (1988).
195. See supra notes 152-186 and accompanying text.
196. See detailed discussion of § 404(b)(1) guidelines, supra notes 51-80 and accompanying
text; detailed discussion of Restatement nuisance analysis, supra notes 121-132 and accompanying text.
197. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.3(q)-i, 230.40-.45 (1992).
198. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1992). Compare RESTATEMENT (SEcoNo) OF TORTS §§ 827(e);
828(c); (h); 830 (private conduct lacks utility where it would be "practicable" to avoid part
or all of the interference [with land use or public rights) and still achieve the purpose of the
conduct).
199. Id.
200. See more detailed discussion of the § 404(b)(1) guidelines, supra notes 70-76 and
accompanying text.
201. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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private activity affecting wetlands. 202 Typically, it is only where the
proposed activity in wetlands fails these balancing tests that a § 404
permit is denied. 2 3 These conditions for permit denial are remarkably
in which a nuisance would be found under the
similar to conditions
2
Restatement test. 0
Because many wetland conversion activities do fall within the
Restatement definition of a nuisance or public trust violation, and
because the § 404 regulations so closely mirror the applicable common
law tests for nuisance and public trust violations, wetland permit denials should rarely require compensation, even when they arguably
result in a total diminution in value. 2°5 As discussed above, such "total
takings", based upon consideration of the property as a2 whole, should
indeed occur only in "extraordinary" circumstances. 06
G.

The Cumulative Impacts Caveat

There exists at least one important caveat to the conclusion that
wetlands regulations (properly applied by agencies and properly reviewed by courts) should rarely require compensation. This is the
cumulative impacts caveat. It will often be difficult to identify and
measure the discrete public harm attributable to a particular wetland
conversion. Typically, it is the accumulation of numerous acts of
wetlands drainage, filling, and pollution that result in severe declines
in surface and groundwater quality, fish and wildlife habitat, diversity, and populations, and in increased flooding and groundwater
depletion. 2 7 Even where the specific harm can be identified, it may
not be viewed as of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the private
development interests in the nuisance or public trust balancing tests. 20
Consequently, unless the cumulative impacts of the wetland conversion are recognized in the balance, courts may require compensation
where the individual adverse impacts of a particular proposed land
use seem relatively small.
VI.

PROTECTING WETLANDS AND

INVESTMENT-BACKED

EXPECTATIONS

The primary objective of the Just Compensation Clause is to
ensure fairness and protect reasonable investment-backed expectations
when governmental regulations restrict the use of private property to

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1990).
See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 196.
Id.
See supra notes 51-103, 144-204 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 230.11(g) (1990).

208. See supra notes 122-143 and accompanying text.
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advance public health, safety, and welfare. 201 This section suggests
measures which may help to better define reasonable investment-backed
expectations, improve program fairness, and strike a better balance
between the public interest in protecting natural wetland ecosystems
and private property interests. Such measures may bolster wetlands
programs in the face of future takings challenges.
A. Clear Notification that Reasonable Property Expectations Do
Not Include Wetlands Destruction
Some uses 'of wetlands and waters have been generally recognized
by the courts as unreasonable interferences with private property rights
or public interests, thus amounting to common law nuisances. 10 Beyond common law nuisance, it also seems apparent that during the
1970s the federal government clearly signaled that future investments
in land uses which require the conversion of wetlands to uplands are
not based upon reasonable expectations and that those investors will
not be able to proceed with wetland conversion. 21 Consequently,
compensation is generally not warranted to protect future investments
in non-compatible uses of wetlands.
It is essential, however, that the Corps and EPA continue to
provide stable and consistent regulation of wetlands. This ensures that
investors do not receive mixed signals with regard to their wetland
property rights. The Corps' decentralized and variable regulation of
certain activities in wetlands fosters continued speculation in wetlands
21 2
on the chance that the Corps' permit restrictions can be avoided.
In addition, the delineation of wetland boundaries continues to
be a matter of public debate and equivocation at the highest levels

209. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 104-143 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Joseph Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom its HistoricalShackles. 14 UNrv. CA--DAvis L. REV. 185, 187-194, (1980); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.
310, 320-321 (1991)(citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.986, 1006-07 (1984); Connolly
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986)). Section 404 was first enacted in
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) of 1972, Pub L. No. 92-500. Application
of § 404 to wetlands was further clarified in NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C.
1975); in Corps regulations published in 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37123-24 (July 19, 1977);
and in the 1977 Clean Water Act amendments to the FWPCA, Pub.L. No. 95-217.
212. For example, when § 404 was first enacted, the Corps insisted that the new laweapplied
only to traditionally navigable waters, and not to tributary streams, wetlands, and other nonnavigable waterbodies. While that issue was settled in NRDC, 392 F. Supp. at 685, the Corps
continued to avoid the regulation of wetands through such measures as the widespread use
of general permits and its "de minimis" exception to § 404 permit requirements. These and
other similar policies have undoubtedly prompted some investors to "hedge their bets" in
wetlands. See e.g., supra note 44.
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of government. 21 Yet, there can be little doubt that the high visibility
of the debate has sent a clear signal to investors. Investing in land
that would be considered wetland under the 1989 Federal Manual for
Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands is "risky business", and expectations that these wetland areas can be converted to
non-compatible uses should not be recognized or protected through
compensation. It is, however, essential to both protecting private-,
property interests and protecting wetlands that a scientifically defensible, administratively workable, wetlands definition and delineation
methodology be agreed upon and then consistently implemented over
the long-term.
Ideally, property expectations for wetland uses would be clearly
circumscribed by highly accurate, readily accessible maps that would
clearly delineate regulated areas. Wetlands mapping is being conducted at the federal level by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, by
many states, and by some local governments. 2 4 The computer technology involved in such mapping is advancing quickly, and such mapping should be increasingly available to investors. 215 However, in the
short-term, high resolution mapping is extremely costly. 2 6 Governments with limited resource management budgets must carefully weigh
the advantages of high-tech mapping against the considerable expense
of map production.21 7 The recordation of regulatory wetlands maps
with property deeds would provide the most certain form of notice
to potential wetland investors."'
Clear, consistent notice to investors regarding the geographical
boundaries of wetlands and the regulatory standards to be applied
to them, and consistent enforcement of those standards, should efjudgments to pre-existing investments in
fectively limit compensation
219
wetland areas.
213. See, e.g., Back in the Bog on Wetlands, N.Y.Tnwms, November 26, 1991; EPA, OMB
At Odds Over Proposed Manual Defining Wetlands, REGULATION, ECONOMICS AND LAW IBNA];
DPCManual Canceled at A-14, A-15 (June 26, 1991); Agreement on Wetlands Manual Eludes
Agencies, Talks Expected to Continue, REGULATION, EcoNoMIcs AND LAW [BNA], at A-16, A17 (July 5, 1991); Jan Goldman-Carter, The Unraveling of No Net Loss, 14 NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSL., 12-14 Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 12.
214. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, STATEWIDE WETLANDS STRATEGIES; A GUIDE TO PROTECTING AND MANAGING THE RESOURCE 36-39, 175-186 (1992); MICHAEL A. MANTELL ET AL.
CREATING SUCCESSFUL ComeuNrTs: A GUIDEBOOK TO GROWTH MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES (1990).
The Conservation Foundation. Island Press. Washington, D.C. 36-37; Maryland Department
of Natural Resources, Maryland Nontidal Wetlands Program: 1991 Summary Report (March
1992) at 3-5.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. The author's recent examination of hundreds of § 404 individual permits nationwide

indicates that many Corps districts are requiring the recordation of § 404 permit restrictions
with property deeds.

219. Of course, prior notice of property restrictions is not always determinative of whether
property expectations are reasonable or whether an uncompensated restriction passes muster
on fairness grounds.
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Clear Identification of Wetland Functions and Values and the

Social Costs of Wetlands Destruction
The State of South Carolina carefully studied, and clearly explained in the Beachfront Management Act, the reasons why it was
important to the South Carolina public to prohibit development on
and adjacent to South Carolina's coastal beach/dune systems. 220 How22
ever, these legislative findings did not satisfy the Lucas Majority. 1
To avoid a similar result when significantly restricting non-compatible
uses in wetlands, it will be important to: (1) tailor legislation, regulations, and site-specific restrictions as closely as possible to underlying state property and nuisance principles; and (2) supplement
detailed legislative findings with site-specific findings and documentation.
Specific findings in the permit decision record should include the
particular wetland functions and values of the restricted wetland, and
the social harm and externalized social costs of converting the wetland
to non-compatible uses. Ideally, this "functional assessment" would
occur in a watershed context, where the benefits of wetlands protection and the external social costs of wetlands conversion can be
more readily identified and understood. 222 Such watershed-level assessments will be particularly important in clarifying the cumulative
impacts of numerous smaller wetland conversions within the watershed, and identifying the social costs of those cumulative impacts. 223

220. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2896-99, nn. 10-11
(1992); Id. at 2904-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Beachfront Management Act includes
the Legislature's express findings that South Carolina's coastal beach/dune systems act as storm
barriers that protect life and property, support a healthy tourism industry, provide important
fish and wildlife habitat, and provide important recreational opportunities for the well-being
of South Carolina's citizens. The Act's findings also state that many miles of South Carolina's
beaches are eroding, and that developments situated to close to the beach/dune systems are
accelerating the erosion and degradation of these systems, and endangering adjacent property.
Id.

221. Id. at 2896-2899, 2901.
222. See, e.g., OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTEcTION AENCY, EPA/503/
9-92/002, Ti WATERSHED PROTECTION APPROACH: AN OvEsvtEw (December 1991). EPA defines a watershed as "a geographic area in which water, sediments, and dissolved minerals
drain to a common outlet - apoit on a larger stream, a lake, an underlying aquifer, an estuary,
or an ocean." EPA defines, the "watershed protection approach" as one in which "[llocal
decisions on the scale of geographic unit consider many factors, including the ecological structure of the basin, the hydrologic factors of underlying ground waters, the economic uses, the
type and scope of pollution problems, and the level of resources available for protection and
restoration projects." See also WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 214, at 168 (Understanding
Cumulative Impacts).
223. See discussion of cumulative impacts, supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
See also, Gosselink and Lee, Cumulative Impact Assessment in the Bottomland Forests. Wetlands, 9: 83-174 (1989); Gosselink, Shaffer et al., CumulATiVi IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN A FORESTED WETLAND WATERSHED IN THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER FLOODPLAIN. CEI-8902. Center for Wetland Resources, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. (1989); WOULD
WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 214, at 168.
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If wetlands, other surface water, groundwater, and drainage patterns within a watershed are carefully mapped and assessed for their
ecological function and social value, the relationships between human
land uses and the local aquatic environment become more easily understood. An agricultural producer, asked to preserve wetlands as
water quality filters and flood moderators, can better understand how
he or she will also benefit from cleaner water, reduced flooding, and
improved wildlife habitat from wetlands protection by his or her upstream neighbors. Each landowner subjected to wetlands restrictions
can see more easily that many other landowners in the watershed will
be similarly burdened in the interest of maintaining and restoring the
important natural functions of aquatic resources within the water2 24
shed .
Wetlands restrictions which are convincingly justified as providing significant community benefits watershed-wide and broadly dispersed burdens should be acceptable on fairness and social productivity
225
grounds, and generally should not require compensation.
C.

Limiting Property Value Impacts

To minimize disappointment of investment-backed expectations
while still advancing aquatic resource protection and harm prevention
goals, it is essential that restrictions on each parcel of land be carefully tailored to achieve specific regulatory objectives. Broadly drafted
statutory or administrative restrictions will likely restrict land use on
some parcels more than is necessary to achieve discrete public returns
in terms of harm reduction or resource protection. Special permits
offer a means of reducing. governmental restrictions on particular parcels where the landowner can demonstrate that further restrictions are
unwarranted to achieve the social objectives of the regulatory program.
Adverse property value impacts can also be minimized by restricting the smallest portion of specific parcels necessary to achieve
the objectives of the regulatory program. Often, wetland restrictions
can be tailored such that considerable developable portions of a parcel
226
remain.

224. According to Michelman's Just Compensation analysis, compensation is not required
when there are "visible reciprocities of burden and benefit, or when burdens similar to that
for which compensation is denied are concomitantly imposed on many other people." Michelman, supra note 39, at 1223.
225. Id. at 1218, 1223, 1225-26. According to Michelman, individuals may tolerate some
disappointment of reasonable investment-backed expectations, without losing productivity, if
the government regulation is recognized as clearly producing social gains (i.e., increased output
of satisfactions).
226. As long as courts continue to view land parcels "as a whole," rather than segmenting
"interests in land", a taking should not result in these cases. See supra notes 44-50, 85-103
and accompanying text.
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Where severe restrictions cannot be avoided, property value impacts can be mitigated by adjusting real estate taxes and tax assess22
ment policies to reflect significantly reduced development potential.
Providing a market for transferable development
rights also reduces
228
the adverse impact on property value.
Wetland regulators might also use available maps and other resource and economic databases to actively identify those properties
that are likely to be heavily restricted in order to serve the objectives
of harm prevention and resource protection. Regulators could then
work directly with these landowners to propose compatible land uses,
tax incentives, and land purchase options that might forestall future
takings claims.
D.

Comprehensive Application of Wetlands Regulations

Typically, what has prompted an environmental restriction is the
cumulative adverse impacts of numerous development activities. The
activities that'actually prompted the regulation are granfathered in
and allowed to continue, while similar land uses are henceforth prohibited in order to stem the loss of valuable natural resources. Thus,
in Lucas, several of the residential sites around Mr. Lucas' property
had already been developed when the coastal development restriction
was imposed on Mr. Lucas.2 29 In Florida Rock, limestone mining in
wetlands was apparently continuing in nearby wetland areas. 30 These
apparent inconsistencies in property restrictions were a consequence
of timing, not an attempt to "single out" a class of landowners.
However, they sometimes raise fairness questions which are troubling
to some courts.23'
Permit-by-permit decisions on wetland restrictions will often raise
questions of consistency and fairness. One way to minimize these
problems is to develop a comprehensive plan for wetlands protection
based upon the type of watershed inventory and assessment described
above. 2 2 Such a comprehensive plan would identify wetland areas and

227. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 214, at 148 and references cited therein.
228. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 214, at 146 and references cited therein; See also,
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (The Court found
that the transferrable development rights available to Penn Central were a relevant factor in
determining whether a taking had occurred).
229. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
230. Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987); Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990)
(appeal pending).
231. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring). See also, FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990). See also, ROBERT MELTZ, FEDERAL
WETLANDS REGULATION AND THE TAKrNos IssuE: WADING THROUGH THE SWAMP. 3 (April 1992)
(American Law Division, Congressional Research Service).
232. See supra notes 222-225 and accompanying text.
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wetland functions which advance the goal of maintaining and restoring the functioning of the watershed's aquatic resources and therefore warrant protection from non-compatible uses.
Incorporating such a comprehensive wetlands plan into local land
use plans and zoning provisions would also add much-needed consistency to wetlands regulation. The Formanek 33 case illustrates the
importance of consistency between wetlands and other land use regulation. In that case, the Court noted that the Fen Complex on Formanek's property was indeed identified for protection in the City's
comprehensive plan .234 Yet, the City was actively promoting and subsidizing the industrial development of the same area. 215 Indeed, part
of the Claims Court's rationale for the marketability of the land and
the need to compensate Formanek was the fact that the market for
industrial development was being artificially inflated by the very government that had targeted the Fen for protection in the public in23 6
terest.
Consistent, comprehensive land use plans that address the community's resource needs as well as its land use and infrastructure
needs, would certainly improve both the efficiency and the fairness
of federal, state, and local wetland regulation.
E. Establishment of Compensation Reserves and Acquisition
Programs
Even with clear notice to investors, objective cost and benefit
justification, and consistent implementation of regulations, there may
still occur isolated takings. This occurs when the demonstrable contribution of a particular wetland to achieving the social goal of maintaining functioning ecosystems is determined to be significantly less
than the costs that will be imposed on the private landowner. 23 7 Such
takings are more likely where the investment occurred prior to establishment of the § 404 regulatory program in the 1970s, and was
therefore less informed of wetland-related restrictions. 238 Takings are
also more likely where opportunities to recoup the investment have
been minimal. 2 9 In addition, takings are more likely where the regulated wetland is hydrologically isolated from other waterbodies and
already significantly degraded. 1

233. Formanek v. United States, 22 ELR 20893 (Cl. Ct. May 14, 1992).
234. Id.at 20896.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 116-118, 211-212 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 45-49 and 85-103 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 151-192 and accompanying text. The social benefits of wetlands that
are isolated from the rest of a watershed's hydrologic regime, and/or already highly degraded,
will often be more difficult to that confirm and to explain.
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Section 404 clearly provides the means to balance these harms
and benefits within the permitting process, and often an accommodation is reached that minimizes wetland losses while avoiding a taking. 14' However, federal, state, or local governments could determine,
particularly where significant cumulative losses have already occurred,
that the wetland still warrants protection to achieve the purpose of
protecting functioning aquatic ecosystems. Because of these potential
situations, governmental regulation of wetlands should be complemented by wetlands acquisition programs and compensation "reserves" which allow governments
to reach fair out-of-court settlements
2 42
with wetland owners.
F.

Clarification of the Standardfor Just Compensation

When a governmental restriction requires compensation, the blackletter law of eminent domain requires the government to either pay
the fair market value of the property prior to the governmental restriction, and to take possession of the land, or to lift the restriction.2 43 However, the fair market value standard seems to ignore the
external costs of destroying wetlands and the public subsidies which
sometimes artificially inflate the market value. This is inconsistent
with our society's maturing ecological values which prize the maintenance and restoration of functioning ecosystems. 2 "
"Just compensation" for regulatory takingsshould generally be
set to restore the landowner to his financial position prior to the
investment, not to insure him a high rate of return on his investment.245 Compensation awards should also discount government subsidies which have already benefitted the landowner and inflated the
value of his wetland property. 2" Finally, governments should have
the flexibility to pay only for the property rights it is actually restricting, and not necessarily have to purchase the entire parcel in fee
title. 7

241. See supra notes 51-79 and 196-206 and accompanying text.
242. See World Wildlife Fund, supra note 214, at 118-119 and 139-141.
243. Compensation may be required for a temporary deprivation of property use while
the restriction remained in force. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
244. In Formanek v. United States, for example, the Court figured that just compensation
required a 37% return on equity. The Court clearly went far beyond making the landowner
"whole", rewarding his wetland speculation and his refusal to sell the area as a nature preserve.
See, supra notes 82-103 and accompanying text. 22 ELR 20893 (Cl. Ct. May 14, 1992).
245. See, e.g., PLATER, ET AL. TAKINGs REMEDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:
NATURE, LAW, .sNDSOCtaTY. West Publishing Co. 1992.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Lucas decision signals a crossroads in defining private property rights: will private property rights developed in an age of plenty
be held increasingly sacrosanct in an age of relative scarcity? Or will
the definition of property rights evolve in recognition of our dependence on wetlands and other natural ecosystems? While the Lucas
majority seems to strongly favor private property rights over the public's interest in wetlands protection, the Lucas holding can be read as
a more careful balance that preserves fairness and reasonable investment-backed expectations without crippling governmental efforts
to protect wetlands and other natural ecosystems.
The § 404 regulatory framework is remarkably consistent with
the Restatement law of nuisance and public rights, and allows for a
careful accommodation of the fairness and property expectation concerns underlying the Just Compensation Clause. Existing wetland regulatory programs typically will not deprive landowners of all
economically viable use of their land and therefore will not require
the payment of compensation, unless the Supreme Court unwisely
begins to sanction the artificial segmentation of property interests.
Even when wetlands restrictions do severely restrict the economically
viable use of land, they are often restricting land uses that amount
to a public or private nuisance or a violation of public trust rights,
and therefore still do not warrant compensation.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules in future cases, governments with aggressive wetlands regulatory programs can take
measures to reduce the likelihood of compensation judgments and
prepare for the isolated events in which compensation may be required. Government agencies must implement stable and consistent
regulatory programs which clearly signal to investors that wetlands
are "off-limits" to non-compatible uses. Careful mapping of wetland
boundaries and scientific assessments of wetland functions and values,
particularly if prepared in a watershed context, will provide clear
notice to future investors, and will help to justify wetland restrictions
as both fair and in the interest of society as a whole. Incorporating
such wetland maps and assessments into local comprehensive land use
plans and zoning ordinances will help to ensure consistency in wetland
regulation. Site-specific restrictions should be tailored to limit adverse
property value impacts to those actually necessary to achieve regulatory objectives.
Governments should prepare for the compensation contingency
by funding compensation reserves and acquisition programs, and by
pressing for a new standard for compensation awards in regulatory
takings cases that provides fair restitution to the excessively burdened
landowner, but does not reward speculation in public resources. It
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is hoped that these measures can preserve wetlands and educate landowners in the short-term, while gradually fostering a widespread and
deeply-rooted change in property expectations that will ensure the
continued long-term protection of wetlands and other natural ecosystems.
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